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NOTES AND COMMENTS
case involving a parent seeing the negligent killing of her children, our
court will allow recovery for such mental anguish and resulting illness
of the parent.
JOHN RANDOLPH INGRAM
Torts-Independent Tort Feasors-Joint and Several Liability
A recent Texas decision1 has evidenced once again the difficulty
'Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 248 S. W. 2d 731 (Tex.
1952).
which has faced the court over the years in deciding whether the acts
of two or more wrongdoers are such as to make them jointly and sever-
ally liable for the damages resulting from their combined acts. There
A, an oil company, and B, a salt water disposal company, negligently
permitted their respective pipe lines, running adjacent to plaintiff's land,
to break on or about the same day. Salt water from B's pipes and a
salt water-oil mixture from A's pipes flowed into a stream, thence emp-
tying into plaintiff's fishing lake, killing the fish and causing other
damage. The court held the two companies liable jointly and severally
as joint tort feasors although there had been no unity of purpose or de-
sign, and each had acted independently in conducting its business.
The cases presenting the problem of joint and several liability may
be analyzed into two major categories: (1) Where the acts of two or
more wrongdoers combine to produce a single harmful result, the act
of one being in itself insufficient to produce the injury, and (2) Where
the acts of two or more wrongdoers combine to produce a single harm-
ful result, the act of one alone being sufficient to produce the injury.
The general rule applied to factual situations typifying the first cate-
gory is that causes of action arising from the acts of independent tort
feasors each of which inflicts some lamage, absent concert of action and
common intent, create no joint and several liability but each is responsi-
ble only for that portion of the injuries due to his negligence. 2
_ Glenn v. Chenowth, 71 Ariz. 271, 226 P. 2d 165 (1952) ; Miller v. Highland
Ditch Co., 87 Cal. 430, 25 Pac. 550 (1891); Symmes v. Pebble Phosphate Co.,
66 Fla. 27, 63 So. 1 (1913) ; Harley v. Merrill Brick Co., 83 Iowa 73, 48 N. W.
1000 (1891) ; Garret v. Garret, 228 N. C. 530, 46 S. E. 2d 302 (1948) ; Rice v.
McAdams, 149 N. C. 29, 62 S. E. 774 (1908) ; Sun Co. v. Wyatt, 48 Tex. Civ.
App. 349 (1908).
With the exception of Kansas3 and Oklahoma,4 this rule has been
'Mosby v. Manhattan Oil Co., 52 F. 2d 364 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U. S.
667 (1931). McDaniel v. Cherryvale, 91 Kan. 40, 136 Pac. 899 (1913).
'Tidal Oil Co. v. Pease, 153 Okla. 137, 5 P. 2d 389 (1931) (and cases
cited therein).
most frequently applied by all jurisdietions in the pollution, diversion,
obstruction, or flooding of a stream by various independent proprietors, 5
Veryheyen v. Dewey, 27 Idaho 1, 146 Pac. 1116 (1915) (flooding of prop-
erty) ; Watson v. Pyramid Oil Co., 198 Ky. 135, 248 S. W. 227 (1923) ; Simmons
v. Everson, 124 N. Y. 319, 26 N. E. 911 (1891) ; Boulger v. Northern Pac. Ry.,
41 N. D. 316, 171 N. W. 632 (1918) ; Sun Co. v. Wyatt, 48 Tex. Civ. App. 349
1953]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
of which the principle case is an example. The fact that it may be
difficult to ascertain the damages caused by the wrongful act of each to
the aggregate result does not affect the rule, or make anyone liable for
the acts of others,0 the theory being that the uniting and mingling of the
separate torts do not make them joint.7  However, the courts
have, in this species of litigation, generally allowed such independent
tort feasors to be joined in an equitable action for injunction although
not for damages.8
Some jurisdictions have made an exception to the general rule when
the acts of the defendants, although separate and distinct as to time and
place, culminate in producing a public nuisance which injures the person
or property of another. Here tort feasors are held jointly and severally
liable although they are not considered joint tort feasors.y North Caro-
lina has gone to liberal limits in applying this exception through an ap-
plication of an implied concert of design doctrine whereby such inde-
pendent tort feasors are held jointly and severally liable if they knew
(1908) ; Panther Coal Co. v. Looney, 185 Va. 758 40 S. E. 2d 298 (1946) (pollu-
tion of stream) ; Farley v. Crystal Coal & Coke o., 85 W. Va. 595, 102 S. E. 265(1920), reversing Day v. Louisville Coal & Coke Co., 60 W. Va. 27, 53 S. E. 776(1906) (pollution of stream). See also Gendel, Torts: Concurrent But Independent
Wrongdoers: Joint Liability for Entire Damages, 19 CAL. L. REv. 630 (1931) ;
Wigmore, Joint Tort Feasors and Severence of Damages; Making the Innocent
Party Suffer Without Redress, 17 ILL. L. REv. 458 (1923) ; RESTATEIENT, ToRTs
§ 881 (1938).
' Warren v. Parkhurst, 186 N. Y. 45, 78 N. E. 579 (1906). See note 3 supra.
a On the theory that it is not the injury but the wrongful act which creates Ii-
ability see Dickens v. Yates, 194 Iowa 910, 188 N. E. 948 (1922); Johnson v.
Fairmont, 188 Minn. 451, 247 N. W. 572 (1933).
' Miller v. Highland Ditch Co., 87 Cal. 430, 25 Pac. 550 (1891); Hillman v.
Newington, 57 Cal. 56 (1880); Johnson v. Fairmont, 188 Minn. 451, 247 N. W.
572 (1933). Warren v. Parkhurst, 186 N. Y. 45, 78 N. E. 579 (1906) ; Evans v.
W. & W. Ry., 96 N. C. 45, 1 S. E. 529 (1886); Pittsburgh v. Pittsburgh &
L. E. R. Co., 263 Pa. 294, 106 Atd. 724 (1919); Snavely v. Goldendale, 10 Wash.
2d 453, 117 P. 2d 221 (1941) ; Farley v. Crystal Coal & Coke Co., 85 W. Va. 595,
102 S. E. 265 (1920).
'West Muncie Strawboard Co. v. Slack, 164 Ind. 21, 72 N. E. 879 (1904) (de-
cided on the theory that if one places himself in opposition to the entire com-
munity by performing acts which in combination with the independent wrongful
acts of others creates a public nuisance, he is in no position to assert he should
not be held responsible except for the actual loss his acts have occasioned) ; Val-
paraiso v. Moffitt, 12 Ind. App. 250, 39 N. E. 909 (1895) ; Simmons v. Everson,
124 N. Y. 319, 26 N. E. 911 (1891). Contra: Tackaberry Co v. Sioux City Service
Co., 154 Iowa 358, 132 N. W 945 (1911) (holding such a distinction too fine to be
made) ; Mansfield v. Brister, 76 Ohio St. Rep. 270, 81 N. E. 631 (1906) ; Mitchell
Realty Co. v. West Allis, 184 Wisc. 352, 199 N. W. 390 (1924).
However, where the negligence of a municipality and an individual combine
to produce a danger to travelers on a public street, highway or sidewalk, there
is generally joint and several liability. Hill v. Way, 117 Conn. 359, 168 At. 1(1933) ; Waller v. Ross, 100 Minn. 7, 110 N. W. 252 (1907) ; Bowman v. Greens-
boro, 190 N. C. 611, 130 S. E. 502 (1925); Dillon v. Raleigh, 124 N. C. 184, 32
S. E. 548 (1899) ; Starcher v. South Penn. Co., 81 W. Va. 587, 95 S. E. 28 (1918).
But see Brown v. Louisburg and Ponton, 126 N. C. 701, 36 S. E. 166 (1900).
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or should have known that their independent acts would create a nui-
sance.'
0
The courts have also alleviated some of the harshness of the general
rule by finding joint and several liability where the independent negli-
gent acts of two or more persons combine to produce a single injury if
it is impossible to apportion the amount of damage resulting from the in-
dividual acts." Likewise, the courts have generally held tort feasors
jointly liable for libel,1 2 slander,'3 assault and battery,' 4 and alienation
of affections,15 provided that conspiracy or unity of purpose is alleged
and proved.
In recent years a vast number of cases have arisen which involved
injury to third persons or damage to their property due to the concurr-
ing negligence of drivers of automobiles-another instance where the
negligence of one is not sufficient to produce the entire injury.' 6 Here
also, the weight of authority has departed from the general rule by hold-
1o This point was discussed but not applied in Symmes v. Prairie Pebble Phos-
phate Co., 66 Fla. 27, 63 So. 1 (1913); In Lineberger v. Gastonia, 196 N. C.
445, 146 S. E. 79 (1929), the leading case on this point in North Carolina, each
defendant emptied sewage into a stream above plaintiff's land. See also Moses v.
Morganton, 192 N. C. 102, 133 S. E. 421 (1926).
1 Covello v. Baumsteiger, 66 Cal. App. Dec. 54, 1 P. 2d 484 (1931). Truitner
v. Knight, 83 Cal. App. 655, 257 Pac. 447 (1927) (collision between two automo-
biles) ; Merrill v. Los Angeles Gas & Electric Co., 158 Cal. 499, 111 Pac. 534
(1910) (plaintiff was injured as a result of the gas company's negligence in re-
pairing a leak, and another's negligence in lighting a stove).
" Howe v. Bradstreet Co., 135 Ga. 564, 69 S. E. 1082 (1911) (no joint li-
ability where the libel of one is republished by another) ; Sourbien v. Brown, 188
Ind. 554, 123 N. E. 802 (1919) (person who composes and reduces to writing a
libelous article and publishes it or if another gets possession of it, either with
or without his consent, and publishes it, such publication makes the original com-
poser liable for all damages occasioned by the publication, the two being jointly
and severally liable) ; Montgomery v. Dennison, 363 Pa. 255, 69 A. 2d 520 (1949).
"'Horn v. Ruess, 72 Ariz. 132, 231 P. 2d 756 (1951) ; Yocum v. Husted, 185
Iowa 119, 167 N. W. 663 (1918); Duquesne Distributing Co. v. Greenbaum, 135
Ky. 182, 121 S. W. 1026 (1909) ; Rice v. McAdams, 149 N. C. 29, 62 S. E. 774(1908) ; Blake v. Smith, 19 R. I. 476, 34 Atl. 995 (1896) ; Standsberry v. Mc-
Kenzie, 192 Tenn. 638, 241 S. W. 2d 600 (1951) ; Kellar v. Jones, 63 W. Va. 139,
59 S. E. 939 (1907).
" Glenn v. Chenowth, 71 Ariz. 271, 226 P. 2d 165 (1952) : Dickson v. Yates,
194 Iowa 910, 188 N. W. 948 (1922) (distinguishes between the terms "concurrent'
acts and joint!' acts, the latter implying the idea of an intent uniting the parties
in a common act or purpose). Acts may be concurrent with those of another,
but with no unity of intent. Wrabek v. Suchomel, 145 Minn. 468, 177 N. W.
764 (1920); Schafer v. Ostmann, 148 Mo. App. 644, 129 S. W. 63 (1910) (based
on the theory that assault and battery is a wilful tort); Garret v. Garret, 228
N. C. 530, 46 S. E. 2d 302 (1948).
" Heisler v. Heisler, 151 Iowa 502, 131 N. W. 676 (1911) : Barton v. Barton,
119 Mo. App. 507, 94 S. W. 574 (1906). These courts distinguish between in-
tentional and negligent torts.
"o These cases usually arise from two factual situations-a person is struck and
injured as a result of the negligence of one driver and immediately thereafter is
injured through the negligence of a second driver before he can be removed to a
place of safety; or a passenger is injured in a collision between the car in which
he is riding and a second vehicle-both drivers being negligent.
1953]
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ing joint liability.17 It is immaterial that the conduct of one driver was
seriously wrongful while that of the other was mere negligence if the
negligence of each was the proximate, concurring cause of the injury;
for the negligence of one will not be allowed to exonerate the negligence
of the other.' 8
Unique fact situations have arisen in the second category of cases
presenting the problem of joint and several liability, viz, where the acts
of two or more wrongdoers combine to produce a single injury, the act
of one alone being sufficient to produce the entire injury. The general
rule, however, appears to be that the tort feasors are jointly and severally
liable since apportionment is usually impossible.1 The theory is that
none of the wrongdoers should complain since he would have caused the
same damage had the other defendants not been involved. 20
For example, the general rule has been applied in the few' cases liti-
gated involving the spread of fires originating through the separafe neg-
ligent acts of two or more wrongdoers, the fires in the course of their
spread combining to cause injury to the plaintiff's property.21 Here
the parties have been held jointly and severally liable on the theory that
if the defendant's negligence isa substantial and material factor in caus-
ing injury, then he is liable notwithstanding the fact that the negligence
of the other with which his negligence combined would have caused
the injury anyway.22
17 Reed v. Mai, 171 Kan. 169, 231 P. 2d 227 (1951) ; Kapla v. Lehti, 225 Minn.
,325, 30 N. W. 2d 685 (1948); Stark v. Turner 154 Neb. 268 47 N. W. 2d 569
(1951) (passenger injured in a collision) ; Gelsmine v. Vignale, 11 N. J. Super.
481, 178 A. 2d 602 (1951) ; Downing v. Dillard, 55 N. Mex. 267, 232 P. 2d 140(1951) (passenger injured in a collision) ; Bechtler v. Bracken, 218 N. C. 515,
11 S. E. 2d 721 (1940) (passenger killed in a collision) ; Myers v. Southern Public
Utilities Co., 208 N. C. 293, 180 S. E. 694 (1935) (pedestrian injured when two
vehicles collided) ; West v. Collins Baking Co., 208 N. C. 526, 181 S. E. 551 (1935)(plaintiff's intestate struck and injured as a result of the negligence of the driver
-of a car, and while attempting to arise was struck and further injured by a
truck driven by the co-defendant). See also White v. Carolina Realty Co., 182
N. C. 536, 109 S. E. 564 (1921).
1" See note 17 supra.
"Oulighan v. Butler, 189 Mass. 287, 75 N. E. 726 (1905) (nitroglycerin
soaked into a floor causing an explosion, and at the same time a nearby wagon
loaded with gunpowder exploded) ; Corey v. Havener, 182 Mass. 250, 65 N. E.
69 (1903) (two motorcyclists passed simultaneously on either side of a wagon,
the noise frightening plaintiff's horses). See also Gendel, Torts: Concurrent But
Independent Wrongdoers: Joint Liability for Entire Damages, 19 CAL. L. Rsv. 630
(1931).
", Corey v. Havener, 182 Mass. 250, 65 N. E. 69 (1903).
21 Anderson v. Minneapolis, 146 Minn. 450, 179 N. W. 45 (1920) (defendant's
fire combined with a fire of unknown origin); McClellan v. St. Paul Ry.,
58 Minn. 104, 59 N. W. 978 (1894) (defendant's fire combined with that set by
another) ; Seckerson v. Sinclair, 24 N. D. 625, 140 N. W. 239 (1913) (defendant's
fire combined with that originating on property of third person); Cook v.
Minneapolis, 98 Wis. 624, 74 N. W. 561 (1898) (defendant's fire combined with
a fire having no responsible origin).
"Anderson v. Minneapolis, 146 Minn. 450, 179 N. W. 45 (1920) ; McClellan v.
St. Paul Ry., 58 Minn. 104, 59 N. W. 978 (1894).
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In line with the general rule in this category the courts have gen-
erally found joint and several liability, in the absence of showing whose
act caused the injury, where two or more persons are guilty of similar
acts of misconduct one of which alone causes the injury. This question
has arisen most frequently in instances where the wrongdoers were us-
ing firearms in the course of a hunting expedition or while otherwise
engaged in the negligent use of the weapons.2 The theory of the hold-
ings is not that they were acting in concert, but that to hold otherwise
would be to exonerate both from liability although each is negligent and
the injury resulted from such negligence. 24
An attempt has been made to extend the rule applied in the firearms
cases in order to impose joint and several liability where there is but
one single injury and one single act of negligence committed by the
defendants, and the proof is not clear as to which is guilty of the
single negligent act. In the few cases giving rise to this question the
courts have held that there can be no joint and several liability but that
it must be determined whose was the negligent act.2
5
In conclusion, with regard to the positions which the courts have taken
in the more common joint tort feasor situations, it seems that the area
in which a more liberal attitude towards holding joint and several li-
ability is most needed is in that class of cases illustrated by the Texas
case, 26 where the majority hold "separate liability" and thus impose the
almost impossible task upon the injured party of proving the proportion-
ate damage chargable to each defendant's act.2 7  Realizing that to place
such a burden on the injured party is to leave him remediless, the Texas
court has seen fit to break away from the majority in an attempt to sub-
stitute greater justice for precedent,28 and directly overrules the prior
" Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P. 2d 1 (1948) (plaintiff and two
defendants were hunting when the defendants shot at the same time in the plain-
tiff's direction); Brown v. Thayer, 212 Mass. 392, 99 N. E. 237 (1912) (the
defendantts were engaged in racing their automobiles and passed one on each
side of a wagon) ; Benson v. Ross, 143 Mich. 452. 106 N. W. 1120 (1906) ; Moore
v. Foster, 182 Miss. 15, 180 So. 73 (1938) (action against one constable for
shooting the plaintiff while he was fleeing where it was admitted that another con-
stable also shot). Oliver v. Miles, 144 Miss. 852, 110 So. 666 (1926) (two
hunters fired across the highway hitting a traveler).
" See note 23 svPra.
2 Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Nall, 178 Ky. 33, 198 S. W. 745 (1917)
(question as to which defendant's employees left a floor in a dangerous condi-
tion) ; Haley v. Calef, 28 R. I. 332, 67 Atl. 323 (1907) (a bridge connecting
tvo towns, each town responsible for keeping its side in safe condition, was de-
fective and caused plaintiff's injury).
"' Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 248 S. W. 2d 731 (Tex.
1952).
See note 5 supra.
28 "Our courts seem to have embraced the philosophy, inherent in this class of
decisions, that it is better that the injured party lose all his damages than that any
of several wrongdoers should pay more of the damages than he individually and
separately caused. If such has been the law, from the standpoint of justice it
should not have been; if it is the law now, it will not be hereafter." Landers
v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 248 S. W. 2d 731, 734 (Tex. 1952).
19531
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leading Texas case on this point.29 It is submitted that if the acts re-
sult in separate and distinct injuries, then each wrongdoer should be
liable only to the extent of the damage caused by his acts. But if the
combined results, though absent concert of design, result in a single
and indivisible injury, the liability should be entire. The true -distinction
should be made between injuries which are divisible and those which are
indivisible.3 0
R. DAPHENE LEDFORD
Trusts-Constructive Trust-Breach of Oral Agreement Between
Persons in Confidential Relationship
In the majority of those American jurisdictions requiring trusts of
land to be in writing to be enforceable,' mere refusal or failure of a
grantee of land upon an oral trust to carry out the terms of the trust is
not a sufficient basis for a constructive trust to prevent unjust enrich-
ment.2
Where, however, it is found that such a refusal or failure constitutes
the breach of a confidential relationship between the grantee and the
grantor, these courts have not hesitated to declare the grantee a con-
structive trustee.3 In an A-to-B-for-A situation, B is said to hold on
"Sun Oil Co. v, Robicheaux, 23 S. W. 2d (Tex. 1930).
" Jackson, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 17 TEX. L. Rv. 399, 420 (1939).
'About two-thirds of the American states have statutes similar to the seventh
section of the early English Statute of Frauds. In at least two others, the trust
section is assumed to be a part of the common law. The parol evidence rule or the
contracts section has prevented enforcement of oral trusts in some of the remain-
ing jurisdictions.
' "However inequitable and morally apprehensible it may be that property con-
veyed upon an express oral trust should be retained in violation of the agree-
ment, a trust may not, under those circumstances, be ingrafted upon a deed abso-
lute in its terms, because if that were the rule deeds would no longer be valuable
as muniments of title." Silvers v. Howard, 106 Kan. 762, 768, 190 Pac. 1, 4 (1920).
The leading case in the A-to-B-for-A situations is Patton v. Beecher, 62 Ala.
579, 593 (1878), in which the court said, "In any and every case, in which
the court is called to enforce a trust, there must be a repudiation of it, or an in-
ability from accident to perform it. If the repudiation is a fraud, which justifies
interference in opposition to the words and spirit of the statute, the sphere of
operation of the statute is practically limited to breaches from accident, and no
reason can be assigned for the limitation." For similar view, see Reynolds v.
Reynolds, 121 Conn. 153, 183 AtI. 394 (1936); Goff v. Goff, 98 Kan. 201, 158
Pac. 26 (1916); Henderson v. Murray, 108 Minn. 76, 121 N. W. 214 (1908);
Brown v. Murray, 94 N. J. Eq. 125, 118 AtI. 534 (Ch. 1922) ; Kane v. Kane, 134
Ore. 79, 291 Pac. 785 (1930); Broadway Building Co. v. Salafia, 47 R. I. 263,
132 AtI. 527 (1926) ; Pacheco v. Mello, 139 Wash. 566, 247 Pac. 927 (1927).
The same, of course, is true in the A-to-B-for-C cases. E.g., Bartlett v. Bart-
lett, 221 Ala. 578, 130 So. 194 (1930) ; Ampeuro v. Luce, 68 Cal. App. 811, 157
P. 2d 899 (1945) ; Keller v. Joseph, 329 Ill. 148, 160 N. E. 117 (1928) ; Westphal
v. Heckman, 185 Ind. 88, 113 N. E. 299 (1916).
In some jurisdictions, the rule that equity will raise a constructive trust upon the
mere refusal of a grantee to perform an oral trust for the benefit of the grantor
or a third person has been adopted by statute. See Uniform Trusts Act, § 16;
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 36-39 (1950).
' "The reason for the rule is that, when a person assumes a confidential relation-
[Vol. 31
